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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1977, the Supreme Court held in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois1 that indirect purchasers
were barred from bringing private antitrust actions under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.2
Embracing a functional reading of § 4, the Court sought to promote deterrence of antitrust
violators and efficient enforcement of antitrust laws.3 The best scheme for vigorous private
antitrust enforcement, the Court reasoned, was to incentivize the best antitrust enforcers—direct
purchasers.4 Yet, where direct purchasers are not the most vigorous antitrust enforcers, courts
have recognized that exceptions to Illinois Brick are essential to proper enforcement of the
antitrust laws.5 In particular, the coconspirator exception has become an important limitation on
the direct purchaser rule by granting indirect purchasers standing where an upstream producer
and a direct purchaser have entered into a vertical conspiracy aimed at injuring indirect
purchasers.6
Taking a formalistic approach to Illinois Brick, however, the Ninth Circuit and the Fourth
Circuit have restricted the scope of the coconspirator exception to cases in which a vertical
conspiracy has fixed the “price paid” by indirect purchasers.7 These cases stand in opposition to
the “first nonconspirator” rule, a functional approach to antitrust standing supported by the Third
Circuit and Seventh Circuit that grants the first purchaser from outside a vertical conspiracy
standing, even where the price has been fixed upstream.8 This Comment argues that the circuit
split should be resolved in favor of the “first nonconspirator” rule, which encourages vigorous

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
Id. at 736.
See infra Part II.B.
See Id.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra notes 69–71.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
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antitrust enforcement, as opposed to the “price paid” rule, which gives would-be antitrust
violators a roadmap to antitrust immunity.9 Part II of this Comment traces the evolution of the
direct purchaser rule and the Supreme Court’s push for a functional approach to antitrust
standing. Part III reviews the underpinnings of the “price paid” rule in the Ninth Circuit and
Fourth Circuits, and discusses the development of the “first nonconspirator” rule in the Third
Circuit and the Seventh Circuit. Part IV analyzes the “price paid” rule and its stated
justifications in light of economic commentary and Supreme Court precedent, and highlights the
efficacy of the “first nonconspirator” rule. This Comment concludes with a summary of the
conflicting applications of the coconspirator exception and stresses the importance of a
functional approach to antitrust standing that promotes efficient enforcement of the antitrust
laws.
II.

Background of the Direct Purchaser Rule and the Goals of Illinois Brick

A. Private Antitrust Enforcement: Compensation and Deterrence
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides a private cause of action to “any person” who has
been injured by an antitrust law violation.10 Importantly, § 4 is an expansive grant of power to
“private attorneys general,”11 containing “little in the way of restrictive language.”12 Courts have
interpreted this broad language as a reflection of Congress’s intent to promote two goals:

9

See infra Part IV.
Section 4 provides, in relevant part, that “[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in the district in
which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.” 15
U.S.C.A. § 15.
11
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972).
12
Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982) (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330,
337 (1979)).
10
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deterrence of violators and compensation of victims.13 While Congress also created a public
enforcement scheme for antitrust laws,14 such enforcement has traditionally been limited to
penalties and forward-looking conduct remedies15—tools that, alone, insufficiently deter antitrust
violations.16 It therefore comes as no surprise that private plaintiffs have brought as much as
95% of antitrust cases in some years.17
Despite § 4’s apparent simplicity, the section has raised complex questions concerning
the scope of permissible plaintiffs.18 Were courts to interpret the statute literally (i.e. “any
person”), § 4 would arguably generate inefficient use of societal resources.19 Antitrust violations
often create a rippling effect, resulting in market injury to remote victims.20 While granting
remote victims a cause of action would promote the goal of compensation, such lawsuits would

13

See Blue Shield, 457 U.S. at 472 (Section 4’s “lack of restrictive language reflects Congress’ ‘expansive remedial
purpose’ in enacting § 4: Congress sought to create a private enforcement mechanism that would deter violators and
deprive them of the fruits of their illegal actions, and would provide ample compensation to the victims of antitrust
violations.); But see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE 654 (4th ed. 2011) (“Unfortunately, courts have never been able to create an intelligible theory of private
antitrust standing capable of being applied across a full range of potential cases. The law remains haphazard and
inconsistent. One reason is that neither Congress nor the courts has articulated a rationale for private
enforcement.”).
14
See 15 U.S.C. § 1–2 (2006) (setting criminal penalties for illegal restraints of trade and monopolization);
Hovenkamp, supra note 13 at 643 ( “The public enforcement of the federal antitrust laws is largely in the hands of
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice . . . and the Federal Trade Commission . . . .”).
15
See Hovenkamp, supra note 13 at 645 (“Most civil antitrust investigations leading to challenges result in consent
decrees, which are binding out-of-court settlements approved by the court . . . . Remedies for civil violations of the
antitrust laws can include injunctions, as well as dissolution or divestiture for illegal mergers or occasionally
monopolization.”).
16
Stephen Calkins, Civil Monetary Remedies Available to Federal Antitrust Enforcers, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 567, 569
(2006) (Describing how the majority of federal antitrust enforcement actions result in nothing more than injunctions,
leading to “insufficient deterrence and . . . worrisome incentives.”); Joseph P. Bauer, The Stealth Assault on
Antitrust Enforcement: Raising the Barriers for Antitrust Injury and Standing, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 437, 438 (2001)
(“Governmental resources are inherently limited, and those scare resources can be devoted to other tasks if private
parties also police unlawful conduct.”).
17
See Hovenkamp, supra note 13at 652.
18
Id.
19
See Id. at 653.
20
Id. at 653 (“For example, monopolization of a raw material can cause reduced demand for products made of that
material. Suppliers of machinery for making those products may also face reduced demand, and some employees
may lose their jobs. If bankruptcies result, creditors may not be paid, leases may be prematurely terminated, and
taxes may go uncollected.”).
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be costly to litigate and would generate only questionable gains in deterrence.21 Moreover, total
litigation would increase as remote victims outnumber direct victims.22 And, even where the
injury is minor, the promise of treble-damages would lure remote victims into the courtroom.23
The Supreme Court feared that this broad reading of § 4 would crowd out the plaintiffs best
situated to enforce antitrust laws and properly deter violators—direct purchasers.24 Sacrificing
compensation for deterrence, Courts adopted limitations on § 4 standing,25 including the
“antitrust injury” doctrine26 and the Illinois Brick direct purchaser rule.27
Recently, courts have become increasingly hostile to private plaintiffs, expanding these
limitations and erecting “ever-higher hurdles to private actions.”28 In particular, recent evolution
of the direct purchaser rule has eschewed functionalism for formalism,29 ignoring “the policies
that animated the establishment of the rule.”30 The “price paid” rule is emblematic of this recent
trend. Derived from a rigid reading of Illinois Brick, the “price paid” rule limits the widely
embraced coconspirator exception31 to cases in which a vertical conspiracy has fixed the “price

21

Id. (“Private enforcement is subject to the law of diminishing returns—the more there is, the less deterrence will
be obtained per enforcement dollar . . . . The amount of increased efficiency in the form of deterrence of price fixing
could be very low in proportion to the increased costs of litigation.”).
22
Id.
23
Id. at 652; “The Clayton Act’s provision of mandatory treble damages plus attorney’s fees to prevailing plaintiffs
has put extraordinary pressure on courts to develop intelligible limits on antitrust enforcement rights. These
statutory provisions encourage litigation by people for whom the amount of recovery discounted by the probability
of success would otherwise be marginal.” Id. at 653–654.
24
See infra Part II.B.
25
Id. at 16; Bauer, supra note 16 at 443 (“These doctrines, and many of the cases interpreting them, are grounded
on sound public policy, of placing prudential limits both on the number of private antitrust claims and the persons
who may bring them.”).
26
See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 497.
27
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977).
28
Bauer, supra note 16 at 438.
29
See Barak D. Richman & Christopher R. Murray, Rebuilding Illinois Brick: A Functionalist Approach to the
Indirect Purchaser Rule, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 69, 81 (2007) (“The unqualified nature of the current indirect purchaser
rule places it at odds with the general body of current antitrust law. Modern antitrust . . . eschews inflexible formalist
rulings that rest on categorical distinctions and instead favors a functionalist approach designed to maximize social
welfare.”).
30
Id. at 447.
31
See infra notes 69–71.
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paid” by the indirect purchaser.32 By denying the best antitrust enforcer—the first indirect
purchaser—standing, the rule weakens private antitrust enforcement by undermining deterrence
and efficiency33—the very objectives that animated Illinois Brick in the first place.34 The result
is that both of § 4’s goals are sacrificed: victims go uncompensated and violators go undeterred.
B. The Direct Purchaser Rule: Encouraging Deterrence and Efficiency Through the Best
Antitrust Enforcer
By restricting output, a cartel is able to extract supra-competitive (above-market) prices
when selling to a direct purchaser. The direct purchaser—who has suffered the initial
“overcharge”—is often an intermediary in the chain of distribution, and as result, will often raise
its own prices in response, causing some portion of the overcharge to be “passed-on” to the “next
person in the distribution chain, who will do the same thing in turn until the good reaches the
final consumer.”35 The extent of the pass-on at each link in the distribution chain will vary
depending on the level of competition in the market, the characteristics of the seller’s operations,
and the degree to which the seller’s price increase results in a reduction in its volume of sales.36
The final consumer and each entity down the chain that absorbed a part of the overcharge (all of
whom have been injured as a consequence of an antitrust violation) would appear to have a valid
cause of action based on the plain language of § 4.
The Supreme Court, however, has stressed that such a literal reading of the Clayton Act
is impractical because it would result in duplicative recoveries, complex apportionment of
32

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part IV.A.
34
See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745–746 (1977); infra II.B.
35
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Indirect-Purchaser Rule and Cost-Plus Sales, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1717, 1717 (1990);
see also Robert G. Harris & Lawrence Sullivan, Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive Policy
Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 269, 346–47 (1979) (“Theoretical economics and practical information about pricing
practices suggest that even in the short run massive passing on is the rule and that in the long run it is well nigh
inevitable.”).
36
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, INDIRECT PURCHASER LITIGATION HANDBOOK, 132
(2007).
33
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damages along the distribution chain, and reduced incentives for the best antitrust enforcers.37
Consequently, the Supreme Court has limited § 4 by creating the direct purchaser rule, which has
two major components: 1) it awards direct purchasers the entire overcharge, even if they passedon the cost to indirect purchasers;38 and 2) it denies indirect purchasers standing, even if they
incurred part, or all, of the overcharge.39 The Court posited that the rule would improve
deterrence and produce a more efficient scheme of private antitrust enforcement.40
The origin of the direct purchaser rule is found in Hanover Shoe, Inc v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp. Hanover, a shoe manufacturer, alleged that United Shoe, a shoe machine
manufacturer, had illegally monopolized the market for shoe machinery.41 United Shoe claimed
that Hanover had not been injured under § 4, arguing that any overcharge paid by Hanover had
been passed-on to downstream consumers.42 The Supreme Court rejected the pass-on defense
for two primary reasons. First, the Court asserted that the complex task of calculating the passthrough, which entails distinguishing between the effect of the overcharge and the effect of
market forces, would “normally prove insurmountable.”43 Second, making the pass-on defense
available to violators would undermine deterrence because the final consumers in the distribution

37

Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 720, 730, 736, 737, 745–746.
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 489 (1968).
39
Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 736.
40
Id. at 745–746.
41
Hanover, 392 U.S. at 483.
42
Id. at 491–492.
43
Id. at 492–493; The Court detailed the difficulties in calculating the pass-through rate: “Normally the impact of a
single change in the relevant conditions cannot be measured after the fact; indeed a businessman may be unable to
state whether, had one fact been different (a single supply less expensive, general economic conditions more
buoyant, or the labor market tighter, for example), he would have chosen a different price. Equally difficult to
determine, in the real economic world rather than an economist's hypothetical model, is what effect a change in a
company's price will have on its total sales. Finally, costs per unit for a different volume of total sales are hard to
estimate. Even if it could be shown that the buyer raised his price in response to, and in the amount of, the
overcharge and that his margin of profit and total sales had not thereafter declined, there would remain the nearly
insuperable difficulty of demonstrating that the particular plaintiff could not or would not have raised his prices
absent the overcharge or maintained the higher price had the overcharge been discontinued.” Id.
38
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chain “would have only a tiny stake in a lawsuit and little interest in attempting a class action.”44
By reducing the incentive of direct purchasers to bring suit, violators would “retain the fruits of
their illegality . . . .”45 In sum, the decision granted direct purchasers a windfall: even where they
had not absorbed any of the injury, direct purchasers could pursue treble-damages. The Court
declined to read § 4 literally and instead adopted a functional approach to antitrust standing that
encouraged deterrence and efficiency by rewarding direct purchaser enforcement.
Nine years later, the Court considered the viability of offensive pass-on arguments in
Illinois Brick v. Illinois.46 Plaintiffs, indirect purchasers, alleged that the defendant
manufacturers had conspired to inflate concrete block prices.47 Plaintiffs asserted standing under
§ 4, arguing that the illegal overcharge had been passed-on to them (by innocent intermediaries)
through two levels of the distribution chain.48 Creating symmetry with its decision in Hanover,
the Court declined to apply different standards to defensive pass-on and offensive pass-on.49
First, the Court reasoned that “unequal application of the Hanover Shoe rule” would result in
duplicative liability for defendants.50 Second, the task of calculating pass-on rates would be even
more complex in the offensive context: “the evidentiary complexities and uncertainties involved
in the defensive use of pass-on against a direct purchaser are multiplied in the offensive use of
pass-on by a plaintiff several steps removed from the defendant in the chain of distribution.”51

44

Id. at 494.
Id.
46
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
47
Id. at 726.
48
Id. at 727.
49
Id. at 731.
50
Id. at 731; Duplicative liability would result, the Court explained, as follows: “Even though an indirect purchaser
had already recovered for all or part of the overcharge passed on to it, the direct purchaser would still recover
automatically the full amount of the overcharge that the indirect purchaser had shown to be passed on; similarly,
following an automatic recovery of the full overcharge by the direct purchaser the indirect purchaser could sue to
recover the same amount.” Id.
51
Id. at 732.
45

8

The Court reasoned that offensive use of a pass-on theory would require complex calculations at
every link in the distribution chain.52
After rejecting unequal treatment of offensive pass-on and defensive pass-on, the Court
was left with two options: either overrule Hanover Shoe or deny indirect purchasers standing.53
The Court chose the latter option for two reasons: 1) the “use of pass-on theories under § 4
essentially would transform treble-damages actions into massive efforts to apportion the
recovery among all potential plaintiffs that could have absorbed part of the overcharge from
direct purchasers to middlemen to ultimate consumers;”54 and 2) pass-through calculations
would require courts to analyze elasticities along with the “difficulties and uncertainties” of
determining the path of market forces but-for the overcharge.55 The Court further declined to
permit market-based exceptions to Hanover Shoe, as it would generate battles over line drawing
in particular markets, ensnaring the courts in the same complex market analysis that Hanover
Shoe had sought to avoid.56 Finally, the court considered the impact that apportionment, adorned
with complex pass-through calculations at every link in the chain, would have on the efficiency
of antitrust enforcement.57 Complex apportionment, the court posited, would increase the costs
of recovery and diffuse the recovery among a large group of plaintiffs.58
The sum result was that direct purchasers, the most vigorous private enforcers of antitrust
laws, would have drastically reduced incentives to bring suit.59 The Court therefore barred
indirect purchasers from asserting pass-on claims, reasoning that direct purchasers were the most
52

Id. at 732–733.
Id. at 736.
54
Id. at 737. The Court further asserted that there would be a “strong possibility that indirect purchasers remote
from the defendant would be parties to virtually every treble-damages action . . . .” Id. at 742.
55
Id. at 743.
56
Id. at 745.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
53
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effective “private attorneys general.”60 Awarding direct purchasers the full overcharge, the
Court concluded, would best promote the “longstanding policy of encouraging vigorous private
enforcement of the antitrust laws . . . .”61 As in Hanover, the court in Illinois Brick embraced a
functional approach to antitrust standing: working around the literal reading of § 4, the Court
adopted a rule to promote optimal antitrust enforcement through efficiency and deterrence. The
best way to accomplish these goals was to adopt policies that encouraged the best antitrust
enforcers to bring suit.
C. Exceptions to Illinois Brick
Several exceptions to Illinois Brick have developed in recognition that rigid adherence to
the direct purchaser rule can weaken antitrust enforcement. Exceptions may be warranted where
the baseline assumption in Illinois Brick—that direct purchasers are the best antitrust enforcers—
does not hold.62 First, the “cost-plus” exception, expressly recognized by Hanover Shoe and
Illinois Brick, applies where an indirect purchaser enters into a contract with a direct purchaser
for a fixed quantity and a fixed markup.63 Because the overcharge is passed entirely to indirect
purchasers, there is no need for complex pass-through calculations.64 Most importantly, the
direct purchaser has suffered no injury, and therefore lacks incentive to bring suit under § 4.65
Second, under the “control” exception, indirect purchasers have standing where the defendant

60

Id. at 746 (quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972)).
Id. at 745 (citing Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968)).
62
See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989) (“In Illinois Brick, the Court was concerned not merely
that direct purchasers have sufficient incentive to bring suit under the antitrust laws . . . but rather that at least some
party have sufficient incentive to bring suit.”); In re Mid-A. Toyota Antitrust Litig., 516 F. Supp. 1287, 1294 (D.
Md. 1981) (“Illinois Brick does admit of exceptions beyond those expressly recognized in the text, in circumstances
where application of the rule would further neither of the policy objectives underlying the doctrine itself.”).
63
Id. at 737.
64
Id.
65
See Hovenkamp, supra note 13 at 677.
61
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upstream producer owns or controls the direct purchaser.66 Because there is virtually no chance
that the direct purchaser will bring suit,67 the first-level indirect purchaser becomes the best, most
vigorous antitrust enforcer.68
Finally, courts have widely approved a third exception, the “coconspirator exception,”
which applies where an upstream producer and a direct purchaser have entered into a vertical
conspiracy aimed at extracting monopoly profit from indirect purchasers.69 Under the traditional
coconspirator exception, where the vertical conspiracy directly sets retail prices, courts are able
to avoid pass-through calculations, as damages equal the difference between the retail price and
the but-for price.70 Because the direct purchaser is an antitrust violator and lacks incentive to
sue, purchasers from outside the conspiracy must move to the forefront of private antitrust
enforcement.71 Duplicative recovery concerns may still remain where a conspiring intermediary
defects from the conspiracy and brings its own cause of action against its suppliers.72 As such,
case law often requires plaintiff indirect purchasers to name the conspiring intermediaries as

66

Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 621 F.2d 323, 326 (9th Cir. 1980); Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v.
Cont'l Grp., Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 578 n.8 (3d Cir. 1979); Jewish Hosp. Ass'n of Louisville, Ky., Inc. v. Stewart Mech.
Enters., Inc., 628 F.2d 971, 974 (6th Cir. 1980); Toyota, 516 F. Supp. at 1292.
67
Royal Printing, 621 F.2d at 326.
68
See id.
69
See Lowell v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 177 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 1999); Paper Sys. Inc. v. Nippon Paper Induss.
Co., Ltd., 281 F.3d 629, 631 (7th Cir. 2002); State of Ariz. v. Shamrock Foods Co., 729 F.2d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir.
1984); Fontana Aviation, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 617 F.2d 478, 480 (7th Cir. 1980); Toyota, 516 F. Supp.
at1293; Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 486 F. Supp. 115, 118 (D. Minn. 1980); Gas-A-Tron of Arizona v. Am. Oil Co.,
No. CIV 73-191-TUC-WCF, 1977 WL 1519 at *2, *3 (D. Ariz. Dec. 7, 1977).
70
Shamrock 729 F.2d at 1214; Toyota, 516 F. Supp. at 1292–93, 1295 (“Where market forces have been
suspended, tracing problems disappear; the whole of the overcharge can be said to have ‘passed through’ to the
ultimate consumer.”).
71
See Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l., Inc., 424 F.3d 363, 381 (3d Cir. 2005).
72
In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., MDL Dkt. No. 248, 600 F.2d 1148, 1163 (5th Cir. 1979). The court explained
that absent joinder of the conspiring intermediaries, such intermediaries would not be precluded “from successfully
asserting in their own lawsuit that they did not in fact conspire with the chains and are therefore not barred by the
co-conspirator doctrine from recovering damages “ from their suppliers. Id. This creates “the possibility of
inconsistent adjudications on the issue of the existence of a vertical conspiracy [which] leaves defendants subject to
the risk of multiple liability that the Illinois Brick Court found unacceptable.” Id.
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defendants in the suit.73 The Third Circuit, moreover, avoids duplicative recovery by permitting
the coconspirator exception only if the conspiring intermediary was “completely involved” in the
conspiracy, which would bar the intermediary from maintaining a cause of action against its
supplier.74
III.

Conflicting Judicial Approaches to the Coconspirator Exception
in the Context of Upstream Price Fixing

A. Running Into the Wall: The Narrow Coconspirator Exception and the “Price Paid”
Rule
The coconspirator exception was severely curtailed by the Ninth Circuit in In re ATM Fee
Antitrust Litigation,75 and the Fourth Circuit in Dickson v. Microsoft Corp.,76 resulting in what
may be termed the “price paid” rule. Simply stated, the rule provides that an indirect purchaser
has standing under the coconspirator exception only where a vertical conspiracy has directly
fixed the price paid by the overcharged plaintiff.77 Adopting this bright-line rule would
therefore deny standing to an indirect purchaser harmed by a vertical conspiracy’s creation of
pass-through damages.78 To justify this prohibitive view of the coconspirator exception, three
principal arguments emerged from ATM Fee and Dickson: First, permitting theories of recovery
dependent on pass-through damages would violate Illinois Brick by forcing courts to engage in
complex tracing analysis;79 second, a broad coconspirator exception would violate the Supreme

73

See id.; In re Midwest Milk Monopolization Litig., 730 F.2d 528, 530–531 (8th Cir. 1984); McCarthy v.
Recordex Serv., Inc., 80 F.3d 842, 855 (3d Cir. 1996); Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 788 F.2d 918, 931
(3d Cir. 1986) (collecting cases).
74
Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l., Inc., 424 F.3d 363, 378–379 (3d Cir. 2005).
75
In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 741, 755 (9th Cir. 2012).
76
Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 215 (4th Cir. 2002).
77
Id. at 215; ATM Fee, 686 F.3d at 755.
78
See Dickson, 309 F.3d at 215; ATM Fee, 686 F.3d at 755.
79
Dickson, 309 F.3d at 215–216; ATM Fee, 686 F.3d at 750.
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Court’s disapproval of market-by-market exceptions to Illinois Brick;80 and finally, a broad
exception would spawn artful pleading that upends Illinois Brick.81
In ATM Fee, the plaintiffs—ATM cardholders—alleged that they had been overcharged
when they engaged in “foreign ATM transactions,” which occur when cardholders withdraw
money from their accounts through an ATM not owned by their card-issuing bank.82 Critically,
plaintiffs did not claim that the card-issuing defendant banks conspired to directly fix the foreign
ATM transaction fee.83 Instead, plaintiffs (indirect purchasers) alleged the existence of a vertical
conspiracy in which foreign ATM owners84 and defendant card-issuing banks (direct purchasers)
conspired to raise “interchange fees,” which are intermediate fees paid by the defendant cardissuing banks to the ATM owners.85 In turn, plaintiffs argued that the defendant banks passed-on
the inflated interchange fees to ATM cardholders in the form of inflated foreign transaction
fees.86 In other words, the cardholders’ central allegation was that defendant banks and ATM
owners had “conspired to fix interchange fees for the purpose and effect of fixing foreign ATM
fees.”87

80

Dickson, 309 F.3d at 215; ATM Fee, 686 F.3d at 755 n.7.
Dickson, 309 F.3d at 215.
82
ATM Fee, 686 F.3d at 744–745.
83
Id. at 744; Foreign ATM fees were allegedly set by the card-issuing banks individually . Id. at 745.
84
Foreign ATM owners can be divided into three groups: “The first group includes . . . Independent Service
Organizations (“ISOs”). ISOs own ATMs, but they are not banks and do not issue ATM cards (e.g., grocery stores
or gas stations). The second group consists of financial institutions that accept deposits and issue ATM cards, but do
not own any ATMs (e.g., credit unions or internet banks). The third and largest . . . group includes financial
institutions that both issue ATM cards and own ATMs. The defendant banks . . . fit into this category.” ATM Fee,
686 F.3d at 745.
85
ATM Fee, 686 F.3d at 746; The mechanism by which the defendant banks and ATM owners allegedly fixed
“interchange” fees was the STAR Network, which is comprised of thousands of ATM owners. Id. at 745. The
network, which is directly responsible for establishing the interchange fee, was owned and controlled by member
banks, including defendant banks, until 2001. Id. Although the STAR network is now owned by Concord, a
publicly traded corporation, Concord established a “Network Advisory Board (comprised of the larger member
banks including Bank Defendants) to advise Concord concerning the interests of the large financial institutions.” Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 752. In support of this argument, plaintiffs asserted that “ATM owners have no reason to collect
interchange fees from card issuers, as they may—and usually do—impose ‘surcharges’ directly on cardholders for
81
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Plaintiffs argued that they had standing under the coconspirator exception: although
plaintiffs had not paid a directly fixed fee, they had directly purchased from a coconspirator in a
vertical conspiracy engaged in upstream price-fixing of interchange fees.88 The coconspirator
exception, according to plaintiffs, applied as long as plaintiffs had purchased directly from a
coconspirator.89 In assessing standing, then, it was immaterial that plaintiffs had been harmed by
pass-on of an upstream overcharge, instead of a directly-fixed price.90
The District Court for the Northern District of California disagreed with the plaintiffs,
finding that the case involved a “fairly straightforward application of the rule set forth in Illinois
Brick.”91 Because plaintiffs’ theory of recovery involved pass-on damages, the court assumed
there would be a “need to apportion” the overcharge between plaintiffs and the defendant
banks.92 That process, the court stated, would require calculation of the defendants’ passthrough rate to consumers—such a calculation would involve the challenges of “tracing the
effects of the overcharge” to determine what portion of the price increase was attributable to the
overcharge, as opposed to market forces.93 The court asserted that these were the “very
challenges that the Illinois Brick rule was designed to address.”94
Drawing heavily from the district court opinion, the Ninth Circuit similarly found that
plaintiffs ran “squarely into the Illinois Brick wall.”95 Fearing complex apportionment, the court
held that the coconspirator exception only applies if the theory of recovery does not involve
foreign ATM transactions.” Appellants’ Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 3–4, In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., No.
10–17354 (9th Cir. July 26, 2012).
88
Id. at 755.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., No. C 04-02676 CRB, 2010 WL 3701912 at *11 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2010) aff'd
on other grounds, 686 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2012).
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
ATM Fee, 686 F.3d. at 749 (quoting Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 2008)).
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pass-on damages, as is the case where co-conspirators directly fix the price paid by plaintiffs.96
Conversely, where co-conspirators fix an upstream price, the damage theory would rely on the
“pass-on damages Illinois Brick prohibits.”97
In addition to complex-apportionment concerns, the ATM Fee court fixated on the
Supreme Court’s admonition of market-by-market exceptions to Illinois Brick.98 The Ninth
Circuit asserted that granting standing to indirect purchasers harmed by coconspirators’
anticompetitive, upstream conduct would improperly restrict Illinois Brick’s influence.99
Without further elaboration, the court determined that extension of the co-conspirator exception
amounted to carving out a new exception for a particular type of market.100 The court, as a
result, found that plaintiffs did not have standing under Illinois Brick.101
As in ATM Fee, the plaintiffs in Dickson v. Microsoft Corp. alleged that they had been
harmed by a vertical conspiracy’s creation of pass-through damages.102 The plaintiffs (indirect
purchasers) asserted that Microsoft and OEM defendants (direct purchasers)103 had entered into
anticompetitive licensing agreements that caused the OEMs to pay an inflated price for
Microsoft’s operating system (OS) and Microsoft software.104 Then, the OEM defendants
allegedly passed-on the overcharge to plaintiffs in the form of inflated prices for personal
computers (PCs) and software.105 The OEM defendants agreed to be overcharged, plaintiffs
argued, because the OEM defendants had received side-payments for their complicity consisting
96

Id. at 750.
Id. at 752.
98
See id. at 755, n.7.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 749.
102
Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 215 (4th Cir. 2002).
103
The original equipment manufacturers (OEMs)—direct purchasers of Microsoft’s operating system—consisted
of Compaq Computer Corporation, Dell Computer Corporation, and PB Electronics, Inc. Id. at 198.
104
Id. at 199.
105
Id. at 200.
97
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of various discounts, cooperation in product development, and proprietary access to Microsoft
source code.106
Plaintiffs argued that the coconspirator exception applied because they had directly
purchased from a coconspirator.107 Illinois Brick did not bar standing, plaintiffs argued, because
the Supreme Court’s underlying policy concerns had not been implicated: first, double recovery
had been prevented by joinder of the OEMs as defendants; second, the OEM’s were themselves
engaged in the conspiracy, and therefore unlikely to bring a damages claim against Microsoft;
and third, the damages calculation—the difference between the “but-for” price of the software
absent the vertical conspiracy from the price actually paid—would not have involved complex
tracing or pass-through analysis.108
The Fourth Circuit disagreed and determined that the coconspirator exception only
applies to price-fixing conspiracies where the upstream violator and the direct purchaser conspire
to fix the price paid by the consumer.109 The plaintiffs’ broad interpretation of the coconspirator
exception, the court asserted, would invert Illinois Brick by encouraging “artful pleading.”110
The court further noted that such a result would be in violation of the Supreme Court’s warning
in Kansas v. UtiliCorp United111 against creating new exceptions to Illinois Brick.112 In
Utilicorp, the Court refused to adopt market-based exceptions to the direct purchaser rule, even

106

Id. at 199 (citing Gravity, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 127 F.Supp.2d 728, 732 n. 5 (D.Md.2001)); United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 84 F.Supp.2d 9, 42 (D.D.C.1999)).
107
Brief for Appellants at 71, Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193 (4th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-2458), 2002 WL
33032432.
108
Id. at 72–75.
109
Dickson, 309 F.3d at 215.
110
Id.
111
Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199 (1990).
112
Dickson, 309 F.3d at 215.
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where 100% of the overcharge was passed-on to indirect purchasers.113 The Fourth Circuit did
not differentiate between such market-based exceptions and the coconspirator exception.114
The Dickson court continued by rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that Illinois Brick policy
concerns were not present. The Fourth Circuit noted that Illinois Brick had contemplated the
reluctance of direct purchasers to bring suit against their suppliers, yet the Supreme Court chose
to express a clear preference for direct-purchaser enforcement anyways.115 Also, Illinois Brickcomplexity was unavoidable, according to the court, because calculation of the “but-for” price
would require the court to calculate the overcharge’s pass-through rate—“the exact analysis that
Illinois Brick forbids.”116 Although such complexity could have been avoided by awarding the
plaintiffs 100% of the overcharge, the court refused to grant plaintiffs a “windfall.”117
Accordingly, the court held that Illinois Brick barred the plaintiffs’ damages claims.118
B. Jumping Over the Wall: The Functional Approach to Illinois Brick and the “First
Non-Conspirator” Rule
In conflict with the “price paid” rule, the Seventh Circuit and the Third Circuit have
produced opinions in support of the flexible “first non-conspirator” rule. The rule permits the
first purchaser from outside of a conspiracy to bring a § 4 claim, even where the claim involves
pass-through theories. These cases recognize that Illinois Brick was intended to promote
vigorous antitrust enforcement—a goal that is compromised by a rigid approach to pass-on
claims that leaves no parties to uphold the antitrust laws.

113

UtiliCorp, 497 U.S. at 216.
See infra Part IV.B.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 216; An indirect purchaser would receive compensation in excess of harm incurred where the direct
purchaser does not pass-on the entire overcharge.
118
Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 216 (4th Cir. 2002).
114
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The “first non-conspirator” rule was fashioned by Judge Easterbrook in Paper Systems
Inc. v. Nippon Paper Industries Co.119 In Paper Systems, the plaintiffs, paper distributors,
alleged that five fax paper manufacturers had participated in a price-fixing conspiracy.120 Two
of the manufactures sold exclusively to trading houses (direct purchasers), which resold to
plaintiffs (indirect purchasers).121 The plaintiffs alleged that the trading houses, along with the
manufacturers, were coconspirators in the price-fixing conspiracy.122 Thus, plaintiffs were the
“first purchasers from outside the conspiracy.”123 Judge Easterbrook, as a result, determined that
“Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick allocate to the first non-conspirator in the distribution chain the
right to collect 100% of the damages.”124 The court held that the first non-conspirator may
collect damages where it can 1) prove the existence of a conspiracy and 2) establish
overcharges.125
Importantly, the court did not limit the “first non-conspirator” rule to instances where
coconspirators fixed the “price paid” by the first consumer outside the conspiracy. Instead, the
court spoke broadly, stating that plaintiffs, which included consumers that had purchased directly
from the conspiring-middlemen, were entitled to collect “damages attributable to [their] direct
purchases.”126 In discussing damages, the court found that the calculation of a pass-through rate,
or transfer price, would not “transgress Illinois Brick” as long as the process would not lead to

119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126

See Paper Sys. Inc. v. Nippon Paper Induss. Co., Ltd., 281 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 631.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 632.
Id.
Id.
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duplicative recovery and the difficulties of apportionment along the chain of distribution were
absent.127
Similarly, the Third Circuit has produced several cases applying a flexible approach to
Illinois Brick. Although these cases do not explicitly adopt the “first non-conspirator” rule, they
demonstrate that the “first non-conspirator” is the best antitrust enforcer, even where an
upstream, fixed price has been passed-on. In In re Sugar Industries Antitrust Litigation,128
plaintiffs—wholesale candy purchasers—alleged that defendant sugar manufacturers had fixed
wholesale sugar prices.129 Importantly, two of the sugar manufacturers also manufactured and
sold candy directly to plaintiffs.130 The Third Circuit therefore faced the following issue:
whether Illinois Brick denies standing to a plaintiff who directly purchased a product (candy)
from a conspirator that had fixed the price of an upstream ingredient (sugar).131
In determining that Illinois Brick was not controlling, the Third Circuit stressed that the
plaintiff had purchased directly from a conspirator.132 Although calculating the impact of
inflated sugar prices on candy prices might have proved difficult, Illinois Brick’s greatest
concern—the “difficulty in computation . . . in parceling out damages among entities in the
chain”—was not present.133 The court was also concerned that rigid application of Illinois Brick
would “leave a gaping hole in the administration of the antitrust laws” by allowing would-be
conspirators to escape antitrust scrutiny “simply by incorporating the tainted element into
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130
131
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Id. at 633.
In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litig., 579 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1978).
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
Id.

19

another product.”134 Adopting this rigid view of Illinois Brick, the court emphasized, would
undermine deterrence and would therefore be “contrary to the spirit of the antitrust laws . . . .”135
Consequently, Sugar clarifies that Illinois Brick permits the first non-conspirator standing even
where defendants’ fixed the price of an upstream input instead of the price paid by plaintiffs, as
long as there is no apportionment of damages along the chain of distribution.
Similarly, in In re Linerboard Antitrust Litigation,136 plaintiffs brought suit against
integrated manufacturers of corrugated boxes, corrugated sheets, and linerboard.137 Plaintiffs
alleged that defendants had restricted output of linerboard—a component of corrugated boxes
and corrugated sheets—and then passed-on the inflated prices of linerboard by directly selling
the finished boxes and sheets at supra-competitive prices to plaintiffs.138 The Third Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Sugar, finding that plaintiffs were “entitled to recover the full amount of
any overcharge,” even though defendants had not directly fixed price paid by plaintiffs.139
Extending the logic of Sugar and Linerboard to the coconspirator context, the Third
Circuit expressly rejected the “price paid” rule in Howard Hess Dental Laboratories Inc. v.
Dentsply International, Inc., recognizing that the first non-conspirator may deserve standing,
even where pass-through theories are involved.140 In Dentsply, plaintiffs—indirect purchasers of
artificial teeth—argued that they had standing under the coconspirator exception because they
134

Id. at 18. The court explained how would-be conspirators could exploit the loophole: “[A] refiner who illegally
set the price of sugar could shield itself by putting all of the sugar into a new product, a syrup, simply by adding
water and perhaps a little flavoring. We do not think the antitrust laws should be so easily evaded.” Id.
135
Id. (citing Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968) (“[T]he purposes of the
antitrust laws are best served by insuring that the private action will be an ever-present threat to deter any one
contemplating business behavior in violation of the antitrust laws.”)).
136
In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 305 F.3d 145 (3d Cir. 2002).
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Id. at 148.
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Id. at 151, 159.
139
Id. at 159–160.
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See Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l., Inc., 424 F.3d 363, 381 (3d Cir. 2005). While the court
did not go as far as Paper Systems, which provided the first non-conspirator with a general grant of standing,
Dentsply recognized that the first non-conspirator deserves standing where the middlemen would be barred by the
complete involvement defense. Id. at 380 n.13.
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had purchased directly from Dentply’s dealers, and that the dealers (along with Dentsply) were
coconspirators in an exclusive-dealing conspiracy.141 The court first acknowledged the
unquestioned availability of the coconspirator exception for retail price maintenance (RPM)
conspiracies,142 which is another way of describing the traditional coconspirator exception
recognized by the “price paid” rule.143 Next, the court asked whether the coconspirator
exception extended beyond the “price paid” rule to non-RPM conspiracies, which would include
“exclusive-dealing or [upstream] price-fixing at the manufacturer level.”144 A non-RPM
conspiracy, the Third Circuit explained, would potentially “allow Dentsply to charge its dealers a
supra-competitive price at wholesale.”145 The dealers, in turn, would pass-on some portion of
the overcharge to plaintiffs.146 The court noted that the economics of a “non-RPM” conspiracy
may be viable where a mechanism exists to compensate the middleman for effectively agreeing
to be overcharged.147
Rejecting the “price paid” rule, the Dentsply court formulated a “limited” coconspirator
exception to cover non-RPM conspiracies.148 The court stated that the “limited” exception
would only apply “where the middleman would be barred from bringing a claim against their
former co-conspirator . . . because their involvement in the conspiracy was ‘truly complete.’”149
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Id. at 378.
Id. at 378.
143
“Resale price maintenance” describes a vertical price fixing scheme in which the initial seller and the direct
purchaser fix the downstream, retail price, or the “price paid” by consumers. Id. at 377 n.9.
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Id.; The “exclusive-dealing” option reflects the alleged scheme in Dentsply and Dickson, while manufacturerlevel price-fixing reflects the scheme alleged in In re ATM. Supra notes 85, 104–106, 141 and accompanying text.
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Id. at 380.
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Id.
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Id. at 378 n.12; The Dentsply court explained that the compensation mechanism, or side-payment, might have
been Dentsply’s role in policing a dealer-level, horizontal price-fixing conspiracy that generated extra profit for the
dealers. Id.
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Dentsply, 424 F.3d at 378.
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Id. at 378–379; In Dentsply, the dealers’ involvement in the exclusive-dealing conspiracy was not truly
complete due to the following District Court findings: first, the dealers were not “substantially equal” participants in
142

21

A middleman’s involvement would be “truly complete” where the court could bar the
middleman from suing a manufacturer who successfully brings the “complete involvement
defense.”150
The court analyzed the exception in light of the policy concerns enunciated by Illinois
Brick. The court first reasoned that the limited exception would avoid the risk of duplicative
recovery by barring completely-involved middlemen from recovery.151 Second, the exception
avoided Illinois Brick’s related concern for efficient antitrust enforcement by guaranteeing a nondiluted recovery for middlemen not completely involved in the conspiracy.152 Finally, the third
Illinois Brick concern—complex apportionment of overcharges—was diminished because “there
would be no need to ‘apportion’ damages between direct and indirect purchasers under the
limited exception.”153 The court, however, determined that plaintiffs were eligible to recover
only the portion of the overcharge passed-on by the middlemen, reasoning that the portion of the
overcharge that the middlemen absorbed would not injure plaintiffs.154 Although apportionment
along the chain of distribution would not be required, courts would still face the complex task of
calculating the pass-through rate of the overcharge, which, the Dentsply court asserted, would cut
against the grain of Illinois Brick.155 Although the limited exception would result in pass-

the conspiracy; second, the dealers’ participation was not “voluntary in any meaningful sense.” Id. at 384 (quoting
Dist Ct. Mem. Op. at 20–21 (Dec. 19, 2001)).
150
Dentsply, 424 F.3d at 379; The “complete involvement defense” bars a plaintiff’s cause of action against a
conspirator where the plaintiff participated in, and was completely involved in, the conspiracy. Id. at 381. “[E]very
Court of Appeals that has decided the issue has held that antitrust plaintiffs who were involved in a conspiracy at a
requisite level are barred from suing.” Id. at 382.
151
Id. 424 F.3d at 380.
152
Id. at 381.
153
Id. at 380 n.15.
154
Id. at 380 n.14; But cf Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968) (creating a
regime under which plaintiffs could receive a windfall by recovering for injuries not absorbed); Supra notes 204–
209 and accompanying text.
155
Dentsply, 424 F.3d at 380 n.15; Had the court permitted plaintiffs to recover the entire overcharge (giving
plaintiffs a windfall), there would be no need to calculate the overcharge’s pass-through rate. Under this set of
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through calculations, the court held that adopting no exception at all—the result created by the
“price paid” rule—would be even less desirable.156 Citing to Illinois Brick’s ultimate aim of
encouraging “vigorous private enforcement of antitrust laws,”157 the court was unwilling to find
that “no plaintiff outside the [non-RPM] conspiracy” had standing.158
IV.

Rejecting the “Price Paid” Rule in Favor of the “First Non-Conspirator” Rule: a
Review of Economic Commentary and Supreme Court Precedent
A. The Roadmap to Antitrust Immunity
The central problem created by the “price paid” rule is that it generates a roadmap for

would-be conspirators to avoid antitrust laws.159 In Sugar and Linerboard, the Third Circuit
recognized that rigid application of Illinois Brick would leave a hole in the antitrust laws: in
those cases, the courts refused to immunize vertically integrated producers that 1) inflated the
price of an upstream input and 2) incorporated the inflated price into a downstream commodity it
sold directly to consumers.160 The roadmap to antitrust immunity created by the “price paid”
rule effectively mirrors the loophole recognized by the Third Circuit. The only difference is that
the “price paid” roadmap adds an additional component to the mix: where an upstream producer
is unable to implement its scheme unilaterally—as was the case in Sugar and Linerboard—the
producer must establish a vertical scheme that enlists the help of its direct purchasers.

circumstances, the limited exception would completely avoid Illinois Brick’s concern with complexity. Id. at 380
n.14.
156
Id. at 381 (citing In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1169 (3d Cir.1993) (“[W]hile
complex apportionment problems are implicated here, we do not hold that litigation must be avoided solely because
it might be difficult to ascertain damages. Injured parties cannot be penalized and left without recourse because
measurement of their damages is difficult.”)).
157
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745 (1977)).
158
Dentsply, 424 F.3d at 381.
159
Amici Curiae Brief of Interested Retailers and the American Antitrust Institute in Support of Appellants’ Petition
for Rehearing En Banc at 3, In re Atm Fee Antitrust Litig., No. 10–17354 (9th Cir. Aug. 6, 2012).
160
See In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litig., 579 F.2d 13, 18 (3d Cir. 1978); In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 305 F.3d
145, 159–160 (3d Cir. 2002); supra III.B.
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Recent economic literature has recognized that Illinois Brick can be exploited by such
vertical schemes, creating a blueprint for immunity from antitrust laws.161 By sharing monopoly
profits with its direct purchasers, an upstream cartel can ensure its direct purchasers (the only
parties eligible to sue under the “price paid” rule) lack incentive to bring suit.162 Direct
purchasers (who, at the outset, are overcharged) receive “side-payments” as compensation for
their complicity, ranging from “hush money to grease the palms of key decision makers to overt
money transfers between the companies.”163 The direct purchasers, in turn, pass-on the
overcharge to its customers, injuring the remaining chain of production and reducing total
welfare.164 If successful, “[t]he cartel is effectively shielded from exposure through private
litigation by an ‘Illinois Wall’ of direct purchasers.”165
Successful implementation of the “price paid” roadmap would require satisfaction of
several conditions. First, the side-payment should exceed the sum of 1) the opportunity cost
forfeited by direct purchasers’ in declining to bring a civil action,166 2) the direct purchasers’ lost
profits as a consequence of a reduced volume in sales,167 and 3) any portion of the overcharge
absorbed by the direct purchaser. Second, the upstream cartel must be able to prevent its direct
161

See Maarten Pieter Schinkel, Jan Tuinstra & Jacob Rüggeberg, Illinois Walls: How Barring Indirect Purchaser
Suits Facilitates Collusion, (Amsterdam Ctr. for Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 2005-02, 2008); The authors of
Illinois Walls discuss how upstream cartels could effectuate the blueprint for immunity through tacit cooperation
with direct purchasers. Id. at 19. Implementation of the blueprint through overt cooperation would be nearly
identical, with the exception that the side-payment scheme would exist pursuant to an illegal, vertical agreement
between the upstream cartel and direct purchasers.
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Id. at 3; see also Edmund H. Mantell, Denial of a Forum to Indirect-Purchaser Victims of Price Fixing
Conspiracies: A Legal and Economic Analysis of Illinois Brick, 2 PACE L. REV. 153, 217 n.157 (1982) (“Direct
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Schinkel, supra note 161 at 3.
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Mantell, supra note 162 at 214 (The transfer payment must compensate the direct purchaser for the “profits lost .
. . as a consequence of their price/output adaptation to the cost increase”).
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purchasers from defecting and bringing suit.168 Third, the upstream cartel’s profits, reduced by
the side-payments, must be greater than the profits that the cartel could earn under competitive
conditions.169 Finally, the market structure must incentivize collusion between the upstream
cartel and the direct purchasers: the most plausible scenario is where the cartel sells a product
subject to inelastic demand to only a few, large direct purchasers.170
The “price paid” rule bars indirect purchasers from bringing suit against conspirators
engaged in the above scheme, allowing upstream producers and direct purchasers to “exploit
their common interest at the expense of . . . indirect purchasers”171 with impunity.172 This rigid
constraint on the coconspirator exception results in a “perversion of the spirit of antitrust
legislation” by incapacitating the “very parties who are likely to be the most vigorous private
enforcers of the antitrust laws.”173 Notably, neither of the circuits adopting the “price paid” rule
dismissed (or even discussed) the roadmap created by their decisions, focusing instead on a
mechanical, and ultimately incorrect, reading of Illinois Brick.
B. Market-Based Exceptions
168

Schinkel, supra note 161 at 4.
Id.
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Mantell, supra note 162 at 213; Where there are only a few, large direct purchasers, the “situation resembles
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unilaterally extract monopoly return from direct purchasers. Id. Additionally, the side-payment scheme is more
likely to occur in product markets subject to inelastic demand because conspirators will have an increased ability to
pass-on price increases down the chain and therefore maximize total monopoly profit. See id. at 216 n.156.
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Id. at 213.
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Mantell, supra note 162 at 218; see also, Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 223 (4th Cir. 2002)
(Gregory, J., dissenting) (The “price paid” rule “is essentially a free pass to any conspiracy that can make the
damage it inflicts difficult to pin down . . . . Until now, that has never been the law.”); Amici Curiae Brief of
Interested Retailers and the American Antitrust Institute in Support of Appellants’ Petition for Rehearing En Banc,
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The “price paid” rule relies on the argument that extension of the coconspirator exception
would undermine Illinois Brick by violating the Supreme Court’s disapproval of market-bymarket exceptions to the direct purchaser rule expressed in Illinois Brick and UtiliCorp.174 In
UtiliCorp, plaintiffs sought an exception to Illinois Brick based on the economics of the natural
gas market: because the gas market resulted in a 100% pass-on of overcharges to indirect
purchasers, plaintiffs argued that there was no reason to fear the complex process of calculating
pass-through admonished by Illinois Brick.175 The Supreme Court rejected this argument,
reasoning that future indirect purchasers would similarly argue that their market situation
allowed for manageable pass-on calculations and that they, too, deserved a market-based
exception to Illinois Brick.176 Echoing the logic behind the Illinois Brick warning against
market-by-market exceptions, the Court asserted that the judiciary would be burdened by an
unwieldy classification system for varying market situations coupled with endless litigation
“over where the line should be drawn” for each market.177 The Court predicted that such a
system would result in the same “massive evidence and complicated theories” the direct
purchaser rule sought to avoid in the first place.178
The coconspirator exception, however, is not a market-based exception to the direct
purchaser rule. Instead, the exception is legally based, a recognition that different rules apply to
different kinds of conspiracies (not different kinds of markets).179 The coconspirator exception
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serves as a reminder that while Illinois Brick bars indirect purchaser claims against horizontal
conspiracies transacting with innocent direct purchasers, a different set of rules apply to claims
against vertical conspiracies between producers and direct purchasers.180 As a result, the
coconspirator exception is not really an exception at all, but a categorical rule that Illinois Brick
does not apply where plaintiffs have purchased directly from a vertical conspiracy.181
In support of the “price paid” rule, the courts in Dickson and In re ATM advanced an odd
argument: after recognizing that the coconspirator exception has been firmly established among
the circuits, the courts, without explanation, asserted that extension of the exception violated the
Supreme Court’s warning against market-based exceptions.182 But broadening the coconspirator
exception does not create a new market-based exception to Illinois Brick; instead, it is a legal
recognition that courts should not deny standing to the first innocent purchaser from a vertical
conspiracy, regardless of the method used by the conspiracy to implement its scheme. And, as
discussed above, the coconspirator exception is really a categorical rule that Illinois Brick is

market-specific factors” nor “case-specific factors.” Instead, the exception applies where Illinois Brick’s “policy of
encouraging private antitrust suits would be stymied by mechanical application of its bright-line rule.”).
180
See Lowell v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 177 F.3d 1228, 1232–1233 (11th Cir. 1999) (The coconspirator exception is
not “based on the facts of a particular market; Illinois Brick simply does not apply to this kind of conspiracy.”);
Amici Curiae Brief of Interested Retailers and the American Antitrust Institute in Support of Appellants’ Petition for
Rehearing En Banc, supra note 159 at 18 (The coconspirator exception is “not based on the economics of a
particular industry, which the Supreme Court disapproved in Illinois Brick and UtiliCorp . . . . Rather, these
decisions simply support the proposition that the direct purchaser rule has no application until one is outside the
conspiracy.”).
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See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 604 (7th Cir. 1997) (Where plaintiffs
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directly from a conspiring party in the chain of distribution.” ); see also California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93,
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inapplicable to all claims alleging vertical conspiracy.183 It would be odd to shape the scope of a
rule which says that Illinois Brick does not apply by (incorrectly) applying Illinois Brick.
C. Theories of Recovery Based on Pass-Through Damages
The “price paid” rule further relies on the argument that extension of the coconspirator
exception violates Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick by permitting a theory of recovery that
requires complex pass-through calculations.184 This argument fails for three reasons. First, when
Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick discussed pass-through damages, the Supreme Court did not
contemplate a vertical conspiracy involving direct purchasers. Second, calculation of the passthrough rate is not always required, as alternative econometric techniques are available to
measure damages. Finally, even if pass-through calculations are barred, and there are no
alternative ways to calculate damages, courts have a simple alternative: award indirect
purchasers the full overcharge. Although the award might give plaintiffs a windfall gain, such a
result is consistent with Hanover Shoe.
Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick did not create a per se ban on all theories of recovery
dependent on complex pass-through calculations. In Hanover Shoe, the Court was critical of
pass-on arguments in the context of defensive pass-on, reasoning that the pass-on defense would
lead to under-enforcement of antitrust laws and poor deterrence of antitrust violators.185 While
Hanover Shoe was also generally critical of pass-through calculations,186 the Court did not have
the opportunity to consider pass-through in the context of a vertical conspiracy, where the first
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non-conspirators are the best antitrust enforcers. Banning all pass-through theories, in this
context, would generate the very result that Hanover Shoe sought to avoid—allowing antitrust
violators to “retain the fruits of their illegality.”187
In Illinois Brick, the Court considered pass-through complexity in conjunction with other
policy factors such as apportionment along the entire chain of distribution, duplicative recovery,
and efficient enforcement of antitrust laws.188 While the Court recognized that pass-through
complexity, alone, was undesirable, the Court’s principal fear was the combination of its
concerns: an apportionment process that would require complex pass-through calculations at
multiple links in a long distribution chain.189 Weighing the combined impact of these factors,190
the Court denied standing to indirect purchasers who alleged that they had incurred pass-through
damages subsequent to a horizontal conspiracy’s overcharge of innocent direct purchasers.191
While the Court clearly expressed its aversion to pass-through calculations in that context, the
Court did not hold that pass-through calculations were to be prohibited in all contexts.192
In the context of the broad coconspirator exception, there would be no danger of
duplicative recovery, the pass-through calculation would occur at only one link in the chain, and
direct purchasers would not be the best antitrust enforcers.193 And, because Illinois Brick is
categorically inapplicable to allegations of vertical conspiracy, lower courts faced with such
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allegations could assess the propriety of pass-through calculations on independent grounds. The
court in Dentsply, for example, found that pass-through calculations were acceptable, as the
alternative—denying all recovery outside the vertical conspiracy—was even less desirable.194
Similarly, in Sugar, the court acknowledged that it would be difficult to calculate the rate at
which a sugar price overcharge was passed-on to candy prices, but that such difficulties did not
compare to performing pass-through calculations along an entire distribution chain.195 The
alternative—to leave a “gaping hole in the administration of the antitrust laws”—was
unacceptable.196 Finally, the court in Paper Systems determined that pass-through calculations
were permissible as long as apportionment along the chain of distribution and duplicative
recovery were absent.197
Moreover, modern econometric techniques may allow courts to calculate damages
without calculating the pass-on rate; as a result, courts would avoid some of the difficulties
associated with pass-through analysis, including elasticity measurements.198 When measuring
damages (the amount by which indirect purchasers were overcharged) courts have several
options.199 They can calculate the overcharge head-on, which would require a determination of
the overcharge’s pass-through rate from the direct purchaser to the indirect purchaser (the
method criticized by Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick)—use of this process, however, is
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uncommon, even in state courts that allow indirect purchaser lawsuits.200 Alternatively, indirect
purchasers can calculate the difference between the price they actually paid with the “but-for”
price, or the price absent the conspiracy—the formula already used in traditional overcharge
cases.201 In calculating the “but-for” price, courts can avoid pass-through analysis by using
comparator-based methods,202 such as the “before and after” method and the “yardstick”
method.203
Finally, even if Hanover Shoe and Illinois brick effectuate a per se ban on pass-through
calculations, and there are no alternative ways to calculate damages, courts can avoid passthrough complexity altogether by awarding indirect purchasers the entire overcharge paid by
direct purchasers. In Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly Clark Corp.,204 the plaintiff, an indirect
purchaser, alleged that defendant manufacturers of paper products had overcharged their
wholesale divisions, which allegedly passed-on the overcharge to plaintiff.205 Because the Ninth
Circuit interpreted the Illinois Brick criticism of pass-on calculations as a binding prohibition on
200
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all pass-on theories, it faced two alternatives: award the indirect purchaser the entire overcharge
occurring at the wholesale level, or bar indirect purchaser-standing completely.206 The court
chose the first option, arguing that barring standing was intolerable because it “would close off
every avenue for private enforcement of the antitrust laws . . . .”207 The Royal Printing court
recognized that the downside of awarding indirect purchasers the full overcharge is that it
presents them with “an opportunity for a windfall gain.”208 But Hanover Shoe, the court
emphasized, “teaches that in such situations there is nothing wrong with the plaintiff winning a
windfall gain, so long as the antitrust laws are vindicated and the defendant does not suffer
multiple liability . . . .”209
D. Artful Pleading
Finally, the “price paid” rule relies on the argument that the broad coconspirator
exception would generate artful pleading that evades and inverts Illinois Brick.210 This concern
is misplaced for two reasons. First, bare allegations of vertical conspiracy do not suffice under
the heightened pleading standards created by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.211 Pursuant to
Twombly, plaintiffs must allege facts moving the vertical conspiracy over “the line between
206
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possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” 212 In doing so, allegations of conscious
parallelism are insufficient; plaintiffs must instead present “allegations plausibly suggesting (not
merely consistent with) agreement . . . .”213 Twombly, as a result, has significantly raised the
hurdle for antitrust plaintiffs at the pleading stage, undermining the notion that plaintiffs could
easily avoid Illinois Brick through artful pleading.214
In Temple v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., for example, consumer plaintiffs (indirect
purchasers) alleged a vertical conspiracy between Visa and MasterCard and merchants of Visa
and MasterCard (direct purchasers).215 Plaintiffs alleged that the merchants—who had been
overcharged due to the “unlawful tying practices of Visa and MasterCard”—had entered into an
agreement with Visa and MasterCard to pass on the inflated prices to consumers.216 Plaintiffs,
however, failed to provide any facts that supported the existence of an anticompetitive agreement
or conspiracy.217 The Temple court determined that the merchants’ conduct could have resulted
from either vertical conspiracy or independent decision-making.218 The Temple court therefore
dismissed the claim, noting that plaintiffs had provided only a “naked assertion” of vertical
conspiracy in an attempt to avoid Illinois Brick.219 Temple serves as evidence, then, that artful
pleading of a vertical conspiracy is unlikely to upend Illinois Brick.
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Second, Rule 11 sanctions are available to curb abuses of pleading rules.220 As the
dissent in Dickson noted, artful pleading concerns are not relevant to standing issues under
Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe.221 The dissent reasoned that the “direct purchaser rule is
designed to encourage and incentivize private enforcement of the antitrust laws, not immunize
corporate wrongdoers from having to litigate antitrust claims.”222
E. The Efficacy of the “First Non-Conspirator” Rule
The coconspirator exception is premised on a straightforward principle: direct purchasers
engaged in a vertical conspiracy to harm downstream customers lack incentive to enforce
antitrust laws.223 Unlike the “price paid” rule, the “first nonconspirator” rule correctly applies
the coconspirator exception by encouraging litigation against all vertical conspiracies that exploit
downstream consumers—the method by which the harm is consummated, whether it be fixing
the “price paid” or the pass-on of an upstream overcharge, is irrelevant. In doing so, the “first
nonconspirator” rule furthers the goals of Illinois Brick—deterrence and efficiency—by granting
standing to the best antitrust enforcer: the first purchaser from outside the conspiracy.224
Granting standing to the first nonconspirator from a vertical conspiracy avoids the
concerns expressed by Illinois Brick. First, the concern that indirect-purchaser standing would
dilute the incentives of innocent direct purchasers (the best antitrust enforcers in horizontal
price-fixing conspiracies) to bring suit is absent—here, direct purchasers are conspiring
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intermediaries that already lack incentive to bring suit. Second, duplicative recovery, to the
extent it remains possible by a coconspirator’s defection, may be avoided through two methods:
joinder of conspiring intermediaries as defendants to the suit225 or a requirement that any
coconspirator’s involvement be “truly complete.”226 Third, apportionment at multiple links in
the distribution chain is not needed, as only the first nonconspirator would have standing to sue.
Finally, complex pass-through calculations, and in particular, elasticity measurements, may be
avoided using alternative econometric techniques,227 or by awarding the first nonconspirator the
entire overcharge paid by direct purchasers.228
V.

Conclusion

Courts have widely adopted the “coconspirator exception” to the Illinois Brick, which
traditionally applies where an upstream producer and its direct purchasers enter into a vertical
conspiracy to fix retail-level prices. Under the exception, courts grant indirect purchasers
standing because direct purchasers—usually the best antitrust enforcers—are conspiring
intermediaries that lack incentive to bring suit. Denying indirect purchasers standing in such
situations would therefore leave the antitrust laws with no viable enforcer: the first indirect
purchaser, then, becomes the best antitrust enforcer. This principle is consistent with, and in-fact
bolstered by, Illinois Brick, as the concerns that are associated with indirect-purchaser
standing—duplicative recovery, apportionment along the chain of distribution, and complex
pass-through calculations—are absent.
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In addition to price fixing at the retail-level, economic literature indicates that vertical
conspiracies are able to exploit antitrust laws in a second way. Pursuant to an agreement with
conspiring direct purchasers, upstream suppliers may charge supra-competitive prices, resulting
in an initial overcharge to direct purchasers. Direct purchasers, then, would pass-on the
overcharge to indirect purchasers, while also receiving “side-payments” from the supplier—the
mechanism by which monopoly profits are shared—as compensation for their complicity in the
scheme.
The Ninth Circuit and the Fourth Circuit, however, have limited the reach of the
coconspirator exception, granting indirect purchasers standing where vertical conspiracies are
engaged in traditional, retail-level price fixing (fixing of the “price paid”), but not where such
conspiracies fix upstream prices and operate pursuant to the side-payment scheme described
above. In adopting the “price paid” rule, these courts have reasoned that extension of the
coconspirator exception would 1) transgress the Supreme Court’s warning against creating new
exceptions to the direct purchaser rule; 2) require pass-through theories that are barred by Illinois
Brick; and 3) allow plaintiffs to avoid Illinois Brick through artful pleading. The Ninth Circuit
and Fourth Circuit would bar indirect purchasers from maintaining a cause of action, even where
they could successfully plead and prove the existence of a vertical conspiracy that fixes upstream
prices with the intent to extract monopoly profits from indirect purchasers. Future conspirators,
as a result, have been handed a roadmap to avoid antitrust laws.
The justifications for the “price paid” rule, moreover, are derived from an incorrect
reading of Illinois Brick. First, the Supreme Court did not create a blanket ban on all exceptions
to the direct purchaser rule: the Court only prohibited market-based exceptions, not exceptions
tailored to address new kinds of conspiracies that were outside the contemplation of Illinois
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Brick. Second, Illinois Brick should not be interpreted to bar all indirect purchaser claims
involving pass-through theories, but only those that also involve duplicative recovery and
complex calculations along an entire chain of distribution. And, even if Illinois Brick were a bar,
pass-through calculations may be avoided through the use of alternative econometric techniques
or by awarding indirect purchasers the entire upstream overcharge. Finally, artful pleading is
unlikely under the heightened pleading standards created by Twombly, and Rule 11 sanctions act
as a deterrent for plaintiffs seeking to abuse pleading rules.
The correct approach to antitrust standing is found in the Third Circuit and the Seventh
Circuit. The “first nonconspirator” rule, which grants standing to the first purchaser from outside
the conspiracy, increases the efficacy of antitrust enforcement by elevating indirect purchasers
where the preferred antitrust enforcers, direct purchasers, have conspired to generate the antitrust
harm. This approach deters all vertical conspiracies that exploit downstream consumers, not just
those that effectuate harm by fixing retail-level prices. Courts, as a result, should adopt flexible
approaches to antitrust standing by viewing Illinois Brick’s concerns as a reflection of the
Supreme Court’s overall intent to incentivize the best antitrust enforcers, not as mechanical
prohibitions against indirect purchaser standing.
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